Cloud Identity and Access: Google Cloud, AWS, Azure
A three-platform guide to human and workload identities, temporary access, least privilege, resource boundaries and access validation.
Content update:
Architecture and operating model
Authentication establishes who a person or workload is; authorisation determines actions on resources. Console access is not database-read access. Separate control-plane and data-plane permissions; resource-creation rights may indirectly enable data access or use of another identity.
Evaluate federation, MFA, group/role assignment and temporary administrator elevation for humans. Avoid personal administrator accounts for workloads. AWS IAM roles, Google Cloud service accounts/Workload Identity Federation and Azure managed identities depend on target support. Temporary tokens reduce static-secret risk but do not make an overprivileged identity safe.
Permission inheritance and provider-specific evaluation matter. Accounts, projects, subscriptions and organisations are different boundaries. Broad parent grants may outweigh narrow resource assignments; deny controls, conditions and custom roles vary. Inspect effective access rather than one visible assignment.
Revocation tests must cover new and existing sessions. Token validity or resource caches may delay changes. Separate emergency access from everyday accounts, monitor its use and test recovery when the primary identity provider is unavailable.
- 1Identity and scope
- 2Token / session
- 3Effective permission
- 4Action and audit
Design parameters
- Identity type
- Separate owners and lifecycles for human, workload and break-glass identities.
- Effective access
- Review roles, resources, parent scope, conditions and deny controls together.
- Token scope
- Record audience, lifetime and target support; do not reuse tokens for another service.
- Event evidence
- Correlate identity, action, resource, decision and time in audit logs.
Platform implementation
Service names are reference points. Scope, defaults, region availability and operating requirements differ; they are not interchangeable guarantees.
| Concern | Google Cloud | Amazon Web Services (AWS) | Microsoft Azure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Human access | Cloud Identity / Workforce Identity Federation and IAM | IAM Identity Center and federation | Microsoft Entra ID and Azure RBAC |
| Workload identity | Service account, attached identity or Workload Identity Federation | IAM role and supported STS sessions | Managed identity or workload identity federation |
| Resource boundary | Organization / folder / project | Organization / account / resource | Management group / subscription / resource group / resource |
| Audit | Cloud Audit Logs | AWS CloudTrail | Azure Activity Log; relevant service logs are also needed for data access. |
Worked example
Assume CI/CD only uploads to a test storage resource. Constrain target resources and actions instead of granting account-wide administration. In OIDC federation, validate issuer, audience and claims such as repository/branch to prevent another pipeline obtaining the identity.
The pilot should allow the intended write and reject writes to another storage resource and IAM changes. Revoke access and measure both old-token and new-session outcomes. Locate audit evidence for rejection; the goal is a proven boundary, not merely successful sign-in.
Troubleshooting
| Observation | Likely cause / distinction | Verification |
|---|---|---|
| Sign-in succeeds but data access returns 403 | Control-plane roles may not grant data-plane access. | Validate target service, resource scope and effective permission. |
| Pipeline cannot obtain a token | Issuer, audience or claim matching may be wrong. | Inspect token metadata and trust conditions in an authorised environment without sharing secrets. |
| Access persists after role removal | Tokens or resource caches may refresh later. | Time new/existing sessions separately and check inherited effective roles. |
Acceptance checks
- Prove allowed actions alongside rejection of out-of-scope access.
- Inventory human and workload roles separately.
- Justify any long-lived secret requirement.
- Constrain and test federation trust conditions.
- Measure revocation in new and existing sessions.
- Exercise emergency access with logging and alerts.
Related concepts
Authentication and sessions
Authentication proves who a user or workload is; authorization determines what that identity may do. Successful sign-in does not grant access to every resource. User sessions, service identities, API tokens and device certificates have different lifecycles. Design session duration, token renewal, employee departure, lost-device handling and emergency access alongside initial sign-in. Measure which existing sessions remain usable and which new accesses are denied when the identity provider becomes unavailable.
Least privilege and separation of duties
Least privilege limits the permissions needed for a task to specific resources and time periods. Giving everyone the same administrator role complicates access reviews and investigations. Separate daily-use identities from privileged accounts, and restrict interactive use and unnecessary network access for service identities. An access matrix should show which operation an identity may perform on each resource. Test whether an application keeps working after a permission is removed: unnecessary privileges sometimes become visible only during controlled reduction.
Trust boundary and failure domain
A trust boundary separates components governed by different access decisions; a failure domain groups resources that one event can affect together. Two VLANs do not create a strong trust boundary when routing between them is unrestricted. Backups in different folders still share a failure domain if one administrator can delete both. Assess physical location, identity provider, management account, network path and power source separately. Test which access paths and recovery options remain available when a component is lost.
Policy lifecycle
A policy needs management as its scope changes, not just when it is enabled. Separate drafting, observation, pilot deployment, enforcement and periodic review. Every exception needs an owner, reason, scope and expiry date. A successful pilot can still cause production false positives if test data does not represent real user behaviour. Identify affected users and applications before deploying with measurable acceptance criteria. A rollback path should identify who may reverse the change and under which conditions, rather than merely locating an interface button.
Telemetry and time correlation
Telemetry combines logs, metrics and events that explain system behaviour. A log describes an event, a metric shows behaviour over time, and a distributed trace follows a request across components. Clock differences can make one event appear to occur at several times. Use synchronized clocks, reliable source identifiers and consistent time-zone handling. Alarm design should consider duration and user impact alongside thresholds. Monitor gaps in collection separately: absence of logs must not be interpreted as absence of incidents.
Version and support lifecycle
Installability does not prove production support. Review the compatibility chain across OS, application, drivers, extensions and management tools. Update plans should record version, support end, restart needs and rollback methods. An unrepresentative test environment can produce misleading results. Validate service health and existing workflows after a change, not just version numbers. Remember that pinning a version can also prevent future security fixes.
Primary documentation
How this guide was prepared
Doz Teknoloji Technical Team. This guide uses provider documentation, shared architecture principles and examples with stated assumptions. Calculations and scenarios illustrate the method; they do not claim completed customer tests or results. Verify versions, regions, service scope and support conditions for implementation.
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